[alsa-devel] Unable to handle kernel paging request in snd_seq_oss_readq_puts
We report the crash: unable to handle kernel paging request in snd_seq_oss_readq_puts
This crash has been found in v4.16 using RaceFuzzer (a modified version of Syzkaller), which we describe more at the end of this report. Our analysis shows that the race occurs when invoking two syscalls concurrently, write$eventfd and write$sndseq.
Analysis: We think the concurrent execution of snd_virmidi_output_trigger() and snd_midi_event_encode_byte() causes the crash. Since the first call site of snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch() in snd_virmidi_output_trigger() is not protected by substream->runtime->lock, it is possible that snd_seq_oss_readq_puts() and snd_midi_event_encode_byte() are executed concurrently in the call sequences as below, and snd_seq_oss_readq_puts() accesses ev->data.ex.ptr before it is initialized.
Thread Interleaving: CPU1 (snd_virmidi_output_trigger) CPU2(snd_midi_event_encode_byte)
ev->type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_SYSEX; if (vmidi->event.type != SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE) { if (snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch(vmidi->client, &vmidi->event, in_atomic(), 0) < 0) ... /* In snd_seq_oss_readq_puts(), * data has the same value with ev->data.ext.ptr * which is not initialized yet */ rec.c[1] = *data++; ev->data.ext.len = dev->read; ev->data.ext.ptr = dev->buf;
Call sequence: CPU1 snd_rawmidi_write snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1 snd_rawmidi_output_trigger snd_virmidi_output_trigger snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch (line #178 in v4.16) snd_seq_deliver_event deliver_to_subscribers snd_seq_deliver_single_event.constprop.14 snd_seq_oss_event_input snd_seq_oss_midi_input send_midi_event snd_seq_oss_readq_sysex snd_seq_dump_var_event readq_dump_sysex snd_seq_oss_readq_puts
CPU2 snd_rawmidi_write snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1 snd_rawmidi_output_trigger snd_virmidi_output_trigger snd_midi_event_encode snd_midi_event_encode_byte
Crash log: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in snd_seq_oss_readq_puts+0xc5/0x160 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:112 Read of size 1 at addr 0000000000000049 by task syz-executor0/12892
CPU: 1 PID: 12892 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.16.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x171/0x227 lib/dump_stack.c:53 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:352 [inline] kasan_report.cold.7+0x13b/0x2f5 mm/kasan/report.c:412 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] __asan_load1+0x47/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:695 snd_seq_oss_readq_puts+0xc5/0x160 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:112 readq_dump_sysex+0x3f/0x50 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:133 snd_seq_dump_var_event+0x375/0x3a0 sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c:107 snd_seq_oss_readq_sysex+0xec/0x100 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:146 send_midi_event sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:615 [inline] snd_seq_oss_midi_input+0x332/0x710 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:535 snd_seq_oss_event_input+0xe9/0x130 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:439 snd_seq_deliver_single_event.constprop.14+0x4bd/0x5a0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:622 deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:677 [inline] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x274/0x5d0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:812 snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0xe2/0x100 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2330 snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x156/0x420 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:178 snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150 [inline] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x383/0x410 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1288 snd_rawmidi_write+0x241/0xa30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1338 __vfs_write+0xed/0x510 fs/read_write.c:480 vfs_write+0x195/0x380 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xd7/0x1c0 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_64+0x209/0x5d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x453bb9 RSP: 002b:00007f46902c2af8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000007080d8 RCX: 0000000000453bb9 RDX: 00000000000000f3 RSI: 0000000020004f0d RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000005ed0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00000000004ab432 R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000006 R15: 0000000020004f0d ================================================================== Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 12892 Comm: syz-executor0 Tainted: G B 4.16.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x171/0x227 lib/dump_stack.c:53 panic+0x1c9/0x44c kernel/panic.c:183 kasan_end_report+0x47/0x4f mm/kasan/report.c:180 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:359 [inline] kasan_report.cold.7+0xc9/0x2f5 mm/kasan/report.c:412 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/kasan.c:260 [inline] __asan_load1+0x47/0x50 mm/kasan/kasan.c:695 snd_seq_oss_readq_puts+0xc5/0x160 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:112 readq_dump_sysex+0x3f/0x50 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:133 snd_seq_dump_var_event+0x375/0x3a0 sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c:107 snd_seq_oss_readq_sysex+0xec/0x100 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:146 send_midi_event sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:615 [inline] snd_seq_oss_midi_input+0x332/0x710 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:535 snd_seq_oss_event_input+0xe9/0x130 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:439 snd_seq_deliver_single_event.constprop.14+0x4bd/0x5a0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:622 deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:677 [inline] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x274/0x5d0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:812 snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0xe2/0x100 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2330 snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x156/0x420 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:178 snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150 [inline] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x383/0x410 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1288 snd_rawmidi_write+0x241/0xa30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1338 __vfs_write+0xed/0x510 fs/read_write.c:480 vfs_write+0x195/0x380 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xd7/0x1c0 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_64+0x209/0x5d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x453bb9 RSP: 002b:00007f46902c2af8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000007080d8 RCX: 0000000000453bb9 RDX: 00000000000000f3 RSI: 0000000020004f0d RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000005ed0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00000000004ab432 R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000006 R15: 0000000020004f0d Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds..
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffe0000000007c IP: snd_seq_oss_readq_puts+0xc9/0x160 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:112 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 30835 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.16.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:snd_seq_oss_readq_puts+0xc9/0x160 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:112 RSP: 0018:ffff880237427238 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000000e RCX: ffffffff83159785 RDX: 1ffffc000000000f RSI: ffffffff83159775 RDI: ffff880237427269 RBP: ffff8802374272d0 R08: ffff88022e7f63c0 R09: ffff880237427268 R10: ffffed0046e84e4d R11: ffff88023742726f R12: ffffe0000000007c R13: ffffe0000000007d R14: ffff880237427268 R15: ffff8802374272a8 FS: 00007fa616b6b700(0000) GS:ffff8800bae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffffe0000000007c CR3: 00000002316cc000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: readq_dump_sysex+0x3f/0x50 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:133 snd_seq_dump_var_event+0x375/0x3a0 sound/core/seq/seq_memory.c:107 snd_seq_oss_readq_sysex+0xec/0x100 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:146 send_midi_event sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:615 [inline] snd_seq_oss_midi_input+0x332/0x710 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_midi.c:535 snd_seq_oss_event_input+0xe9/0x130 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_event.c:439 snd_seq_deliver_single_event.constprop.14+0x4bd/0x5a0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:622 deliver_to_subscribers sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:677 [inline] snd_seq_deliver_event+0x274/0x5d0 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:812 snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch+0xe2/0x100 sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c:2330 snd_virmidi_output_trigger+0x156/0x420 sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c:178 snd_rawmidi_output_trigger sound/core/rawmidi.c:150 [inline] snd_rawmidi_kernel_write1+0x383/0x410 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1288 snd_rawmidi_write+0x241/0xa30 sound/core/rawmidi.c:1338 __vfs_write+0xed/0x510 fs/read_write.c:480 vfs_write+0x195/0x380 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xd7/0x1c0 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_64+0x209/0x5d0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7 RIP: 0033:0x453bb9 RSP: 002b:00007fa616b6aaf8 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000708020 RCX: 0000000000453bb9 RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 0000000020002ff8 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000005ef0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00000000004ad178 R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000006 R15: 0000000020002ff8 Code: 8d 7e 02 c6 45 98 05 e8 26 a1 5c fe 44 88 6d 9a eb 4a e8 7b 47 36 fe 4c 89 e7 4d 8d 6c 24 01 83 eb 01 e8 bb a0 5c fe 49 8d 7e 01 <45> 0f b6 24 24 e8 fd a0 5c fe 48 8b bd 70 ff ff ff 4c 89 f6 45 RIP: snd_seq_oss_readq_puts+0xc9/0x160 sound/core/seq/oss/seq_oss_readq.c:112 RSP: ffff880237427238 CR2: ffffe0000000007c ---[ end trace 029460d043170cd7 ]---
= About RaceFuzzer
RaceFuzzer is a customized version of Syzkaller, specifically tailored to find race condition bugs in the Linux kernel. While we leverage many different technique, the notable feature of RaceFuzzer is in leveraging a custom hypervisor (QEMU/KVM) to interleave the scheduling. In particular, we modified the hypervisor to intentionally stall a per-core execution, which is similar to supporting per-core breakpoint functionality. This allows RaceFuzzer to force the kernel to deterministically trigger racy condition (which may rarely happen in practice due to randomness in scheduling).
RaceFuzzer's C repro always pinpoints two racy syscalls. Since C repro's scheduling synchronization should be performed at the user space, its reproducibility is limited (reproduction may take from 1 second to 10 minutes (or even more), depending on a bug). This is because, while RaceFuzzer precisely interleaves the scheduling at the kernel's instruction level when finding this bug, C repro cannot fully utilize such a feature. Please disregard all code related to "should_hypercall" in the C repro, as this is only for our debugging purposes using our own hypervisor.
On Thu, 26 Apr 2018 06:52:27 +0200, DaeRyong Jeong wrote:
We report the crash: unable to handle kernel paging request in snd_seq_oss_readq_puts
This crash has been found in v4.16 using RaceFuzzer (a modified version of Syzkaller), which we describe more at the end of this report. Our analysis shows that the race occurs when invoking two syscalls concurrently, write$eventfd and write$sndseq.
Analysis: We think the concurrent execution of snd_virmidi_output_trigger() and snd_midi_event_encode_byte() causes the crash. Since the first call site of snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch() in snd_virmidi_output_trigger() is not protected by substream->runtime->lock, it is possible that snd_seq_oss_readq_puts() and snd_midi_event_encode_byte() are executed concurrently in the call sequences as below, and snd_seq_oss_readq_puts() accesses ev->data.ex.ptr before it is initialized.
Thanks for the bug report and analysis.
I guess that it's not about initialization but rather other way round. The first task sends the pending event with SYSEX that contains the buffer pointer in the event packet. Meanwhile, the second task now starts processing the MIDI stream and overwrites this event packet. So the data address that is being processed is overwritten, and it leads to the crash.
Below is the fix patch. It's totally untested, and I'd love to hear if this really works. Could you give it a try?
thanks,
Takashi
-- 8< -- From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: seq: Fix races at MIDI encoding in snd_virmidi_output_trigger()
The sequencer virmidi code has an open race at its output trigger callback: namely, virmidi keeps only one event packet for processing while it doesn't protect for concurrent output trigger calls.
snd_virmidi_output_trigger() tries to process the previously unfinished event before starting encoding the given MIDI stream, but this is done without any lock. Meanwhile, if another rawmidi stream starts the output trigger, this proceeds further, and overwrites the event package that is being processed in another thread. This eventually corrupts and may lead to the invalid memory access if the event type is like SYSEX.
The fix is just to move the spinlock to cover both the pending event and the new stream.
The bug was spotted by a new fuzzer, RaceFuzzer.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426045223.GA15307@dragonet.kaist.ac.kr Reported-by: DaeRyong Jeong threeearcat@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de --- sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c index f48a4cd24ffc..289ae6bb81d9 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c @@ -174,12 +174,12 @@ static void snd_virmidi_output_trigger(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, } return; } + spin_lock_irqsave(&substream->runtime->lock, flags); if (vmidi->event.type != SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE) { if (snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch(vmidi->client, &vmidi->event, in_atomic(), 0) < 0) - return; + goto out; vmidi->event.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE; } - spin_lock_irqsave(&substream->runtime->lock, flags); while (1) { count = __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (count <= 0)
On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 09:17:45AM +0200, Takashi Iwai wrote:
On Thu, 26 Apr 2018 06:52:27 +0200, DaeRyong Jeong wrote:
We report the crash: unable to handle kernel paging request in snd_seq_oss_readq_puts
This crash has been found in v4.16 using RaceFuzzer (a modified version of Syzkaller), which we describe more at the end of this report. Our analysis shows that the race occurs when invoking two syscalls concurrently, write$eventfd and write$sndseq.
Analysis: We think the concurrent execution of snd_virmidi_output_trigger() and snd_midi_event_encode_byte() causes the crash. Since the first call site of snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch() in snd_virmidi_output_trigger() is not protected by substream->runtime->lock, it is possible that snd_seq_oss_readq_puts() and snd_midi_event_encode_byte() are executed concurrently in the call sequences as below, and snd_seq_oss_readq_puts() accesses ev->data.ex.ptr before it is initialized.
Thanks for the bug report and analysis.
I guess that it's not about initialization but rather other way round. The first task sends the pending event with SYSEX that contains the buffer pointer in the event packet. Meanwhile, the second task now starts processing the MIDI stream and overwrites this event packet. So the data address that is being processed is overwritten, and it leads to the crash.
Below is the fix patch. It's totally untested, and I'd love to hear if this really works. Could you give it a try?
thanks,
Takashi
-- 8< -- From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: seq: Fix races at MIDI encoding in snd_virmidi_output_trigger()
The sequencer virmidi code has an open race at its output trigger callback: namely, virmidi keeps only one event packet for processing while it doesn't protect for concurrent output trigger calls.
snd_virmidi_output_trigger() tries to process the previously unfinished event before starting encoding the given MIDI stream, but this is done without any lock. Meanwhile, if another rawmidi stream starts the output trigger, this proceeds further, and overwrites the event package that is being processed in another thread. This eventually corrupts and may lead to the invalid memory access if the event type is like SYSEX.
The fix is just to move the spinlock to cover both the pending event and the new stream.
The bug was spotted by a new fuzzer, RaceFuzzer.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426045223.GA15307@dragonet.kaist.ac.kr Reported-by: DaeRyong Jeong threeearcat@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de
sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c index f48a4cd24ffc..289ae6bb81d9 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c @@ -174,12 +174,12 @@ static void snd_virmidi_output_trigger(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, } return; }
if (vmidi->event.type != SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE) { if (snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch(vmidi->client, &vmidi->event, in_atomic(), 0) < 0)spin_lock_irqsave(&substream->runtime->lock, flags);
return;
}goto out; vmidi->event.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE;
while (1) { count = __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (count <= 0)spin_lock_irqsave(&substream->runtime->lock, flags);
-- 2.16.3
I'm really sorry to say this. Since we are implementing our fuzzer and our reproducer is not complete, we don't have a reproducer for this bug. We manually analyzed the crash using the crash log to spot where the race occurs. The patch looks good for me who don't understand the ALSA subsystem, but we can't test the patch.
I'm sorry.
Daeryong Jeong
On Fri, 27 Apr 2018 03:48:59 +0200, DaeRyong Jeong wrote:
On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 09:17:45AM +0200, Takashi Iwai wrote:
On Thu, 26 Apr 2018 06:52:27 +0200, DaeRyong Jeong wrote:
We report the crash: unable to handle kernel paging request in snd_seq_oss_readq_puts
This crash has been found in v4.16 using RaceFuzzer (a modified version of Syzkaller), which we describe more at the end of this report. Our analysis shows that the race occurs when invoking two syscalls concurrently, write$eventfd and write$sndseq.
Analysis: We think the concurrent execution of snd_virmidi_output_trigger() and snd_midi_event_encode_byte() causes the crash. Since the first call site of snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch() in snd_virmidi_output_trigger() is not protected by substream->runtime->lock, it is possible that snd_seq_oss_readq_puts() and snd_midi_event_encode_byte() are executed concurrently in the call sequences as below, and snd_seq_oss_readq_puts() accesses ev->data.ex.ptr before it is initialized.
Thanks for the bug report and analysis.
I guess that it's not about initialization but rather other way round. The first task sends the pending event with SYSEX that contains the buffer pointer in the event packet. Meanwhile, the second task now starts processing the MIDI stream and overwrites this event packet. So the data address that is being processed is overwritten, and it leads to the crash.
Below is the fix patch. It's totally untested, and I'd love to hear if this really works. Could you give it a try?
thanks,
Takashi
-- 8< -- From: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de Subject: [PATCH] ALSA: seq: Fix races at MIDI encoding in snd_virmidi_output_trigger()
The sequencer virmidi code has an open race at its output trigger callback: namely, virmidi keeps only one event packet for processing while it doesn't protect for concurrent output trigger calls.
snd_virmidi_output_trigger() tries to process the previously unfinished event before starting encoding the given MIDI stream, but this is done without any lock. Meanwhile, if another rawmidi stream starts the output trigger, this proceeds further, and overwrites the event package that is being processed in another thread. This eventually corrupts and may lead to the invalid memory access if the event type is like SYSEX.
The fix is just to move the spinlock to cover both the pending event and the new stream.
The bug was spotted by a new fuzzer, RaceFuzzer.
BugLink: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180426045223.GA15307@dragonet.kaist.ac.kr Reported-by: DaeRyong Jeong threeearcat@gmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai tiwai@suse.de
sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c index f48a4cd24ffc..289ae6bb81d9 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_virmidi.c @@ -174,12 +174,12 @@ static void snd_virmidi_output_trigger(struct snd_rawmidi_substream *substream, } return; }
if (vmidi->event.type != SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE) { if (snd_seq_kernel_client_dispatch(vmidi->client, &vmidi->event, in_atomic(), 0) < 0)spin_lock_irqsave(&substream->runtime->lock, flags);
return;
}goto out; vmidi->event.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_NONE;
while (1) { count = __snd_rawmidi_transmit_peek(substream, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (count <= 0)spin_lock_irqsave(&substream->runtime->lock, flags);
-- 2.16.3
I'm really sorry to say this. Since we are implementing our fuzzer and our reproducer is not complete, we don't have a reproducer for this bug. We manually analyzed the crash using the crash log to spot where the race occurs. The patch looks good for me who don't understand the ALSA subsystem, but we can't test the patch.
I'm sorry.
No need for sorry, it means positive, just that it's hard to trigger :)
In anyway, I queued the fix patch now. Thanks!
Takashi
participants (2)
-
DaeRyong Jeong
-
Takashi Iwai