User space could pass arbitrary ranges, which were uncritically accepted. This could lead to table lookups out of range.
I don't think that this is a security issue, as it only allowed someone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN to crash the kernel, but still.
Setting an invalid translation mode will also be rejected now. That did no harm, but it's still better to detect errors.
Signed-off-by: Oswald Buddenhagen oswald.buddenhagen@gmx.de --- sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c index fbc1bfc122fc..796e24b6f01a 100644 --- a/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c +++ b/sound/pci/emu10k1/emufx.c @@ -769,6 +769,32 @@ static int snd_emu10k1_verify_controls(struct snd_emu10k1 *emu, err = -EINVAL; goto __error; } + switch (gctl->translation) { + case EMU10K1_GPR_TRANSLATION_NONE: + break; + case EMU10K1_GPR_TRANSLATION_TABLE100: + if (gctl->min != 0 || gctl->max != 100) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto __error; + } + break; + case EMU10K1_GPR_TRANSLATION_BASS: + case EMU10K1_GPR_TRANSLATION_TREBLE: + if (gctl->min != 0 || gctl->max != 40) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto __error; + } + break; + case EMU10K1_GPR_TRANSLATION_ONOFF: + if (gctl->min != 0 || gctl->max != 1) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto __error; + } + break; + default: + err = -EINVAL; + goto __error; + } } for (i = 0; i < icode->gpr_list_control_count; i++) { /* FIXME: we need to check the WRITE access */