[alsa-devel] [PATCH 0/2] ALSA: pcm: implement the anonymous dup v3

Phil Burk philburk at google.com
Thu Jan 31 01:45:04 CET 2019


Hello Mark,

Our security team was very concerned about the old ALSA FD. It provided too
much access to the guts of ALSA.

I assume they will not like anything other than a plain
"anon_inode:dmabuf". If it is a new FD, then the code would have to be
reviewed. Even if it looked OK there might be some holes that we don't
find. So it would probably be rejected.

I cannot speak for our security team so I am working on setting up a
meeting or conversation between Mark and Zach, our security expert.

Adding the anon_inode:snd-pcm might be great for ALSA. That could be used
by the HAL for STATUS and CONTROL. But it is likely that we will need an
additional anon_inode:dmabuf FD that is only associated with the PCM
buffer. It can then be safely passed to an Android app.

Thanks,
Phil Burk


On Wed, Jan 30, 2019 at 2:32 PM Mark Brown <broonie at kernel.org> wrote:

> On Wed, Jan 30, 2019 at 01:41:37PM +0100, Jaroslav Kysela wrote:
> > This patchset contains the anonymous dup implementation with permissions
> > checking for the ALSA's PCM interface in kernel to enable the restricted
> > DMA sound buffer sharing for the restricted tasks.
> >
> > The code was tested through qemu and it seems to be pretty stable.
> >
> > The initial tinyalsa implementation can be found here:
> >
> >   https://github.com/perexg/tinyalsa/commits/anondup
> >
> > The filtering might be refined. It depends on the real requirements.
> > Perhaps, we may create more ioctl groups. Any comments are more than
> > welcome.
>
> My understanding based on some off-list discussion is that the Android
> security people are going to see anything that involves passing more
> than a block of memory (and in particular anything that gives access to
> the sound APIs) as a problem.  That's obviously going to be an issue for
> anything O_APPEND based.  My understanding is that this is fundamentally
> a risk mitigation thing - by not having any of the sound kernel
> interfaces available to the applications affected there's no possibility
> that any problems in the sound code can cause security issues.
>


More information about the Alsa-devel mailing list