[alsa-devel] [PATCH 2/3] ALSA: control: add dimension validator for userspace element

[Takashi Sakamoto]

On Jul 1 2016 17:50, Takashi Iwai wrote:
> On Fri, 01 Jul 2016 10:30:20 +0200,
> Takashi Sakamoto wrote:
>>
>> On Jul 1 2016 16:19, Takashi Iwai wrote:
>>> On Fri, 01 Jul 2016 06:15:10 +0200,
>>> Takashi Sakamoto wrote:
>>>>
>>>> The 'dimen' field in struct snd_ctl_elem_info is used to compose all of
>>>> members in the element as multi-dimensional matrix. The field has four
>>>> members. Each member represents the width in each dimension level by
>>>> element member unit. For example, if the members consist of typical
>>>> two dimensional matrix, the dimen[0] represents the number of rows
>>>> and dimen[1] represents the number of columns (or vise-versa).
>>>>
>>>> The total members in the matrix should be within the number of members in
>>>> the element, while current implementation has no validator of this
>>>> information. In a view of userspace applications, the information must be
>>>> valid so that it cannot cause any bugs such as buffer-over-run.
>>>>
>>>> This commit adds a validator of dimension information for userspace
>>>> applications which add new element sets. When they add the element sets
>>>> with wrong dimension information, they receive -EINVAL.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Takashi Sakamoto <o-takashi at sakamocchi.jp>
>>>> ---
>>>>  sound/core/control.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>>  1 file changed, 39 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/sound/core/control.c b/sound/core/control.c
>>>> index a85d455..eeb080f 100644
>>>> --- a/sound/core/control.c
>>>> +++ b/sound/core/control.c
>>>> @@ -805,6 +805,43 @@ static int snd_ctl_elem_list(struct snd_card *card,
>>>>  	return 0;
>>>>  }
>>>>  
>>>> +static bool validate_element_member_dimension(struct snd_ctl_elem_info *info)
>>>> +{
>>>> +	unsigned int members;
>>>> +	unsigned int i = 0;
>>>> +
>>>> +	/* The value for each level should be zero or positive. */
>>>> +	if (info->dimen.d[0] < 0)
>>>> +		return false;
>>>> +	members = info->dimen.d[0];
>>>> +
>>>> +	if (members > 0) {
>>>> +		for (++i; i < ARRAY_SIZE(info->dimen.d); ++i) {
>>>> +			if (info->dimen.d[i] < 0)
>>>> +				return false;
>>>> +			if (info->dimen.d[i] == 0)
>>>> +				break;
>>>> +
>>>> +			/* Prevention of division by zero, for safe. */
>>>> +			if (members == 0)
>>>> +				return false;
>>>> +			/* Prevent arithmetic overflow. */
>>>> +			if (info->dimen.d[i] > UINT_MAX / members)
>>>> +				return false;
>>>> +
>>>> +			members *= info->dimen.d[i];
>>>> +		}
>>>> +	}
>>>> +
>>>> +	/* The rest of level should be zero. */
>>>> +	for (++i; i < ARRAY_SIZE(info->dimen.d); ++i) {
>>>> +		if (info->dimen.d[i] != 0)
>>>> +			return false;
>>>> +	}
>>>> +
>>>> +	return members <= info->count;
>>>
>>> Well, since the dimen is 16bit short, it's easier to check the
>>> overflow just by comparing the value with info->count at each time
>>> (supposing info->count being the right value).
>>
>> Your logic still causes arithmetic overflow. Let's assume a case that
>> the first element of dimension info has 3 or more and the second has
>> SHRT_MAX.
> 
> Remember that elements is 32bit unsigned int...

Oops. A document in my hand has wrong value about it...

Anyway, it's better to avoid evaluation after calculation because we can
assume that SHRT_MAX x SHRT_MAX from raw dimension info.

>> It's better to avoid evaluation after calculation.
>>
>>> That is, something like this:
>>>
>>> 	/* If no dimension is given, it's OK */
>>> 	if (!info->dimen.d[0])
>>> 		return true;
>>>
>>> 	elements = 1;
>>> 	for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(info->dimen.d); i++) {
>>> 		if (info->dimen.d[i] < 0)
>>> 			return false;
>>> 		if (!info->dimen.d[i])
>>> 			break;
>>
>> Were I you, I would insert codes to evaluate the element of dimension
>> info; i.e.
>>
>>                 if (info->dimen.d[i] > 512)
>>                         break;
>>
>> Here, 512 is the maximum number of members which an element can have. In
>> this case, it's certainly an element of byte type.
> 
> It's superfluous.  If info->count is already a sane value, it'd be
> enough to compare with this.

The info->count comes from userspace or each driver. It's dangerous to
use it for avoiding arithmetic overflow.


Regards

Takashi Sakamoto